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Use of Presumptions to Establish the
Tort of Instigation of Strikes in
Breach of Contract
By OWEN F~iwFAnmm*
T O an employer, the most important provision of a collective bar-
gaining agreement is the pledge that there shall be no strikes during
its term. This commitment enables an employer to make plans. De-
liveries can be scheduled on the assumption of uninterrupted produc-
tion. A strike in breach of this basic commitment frustrates, from the
employer's point of view, the economic purpose of the agreement.
Furthermore, as our national labor policy develops, it is clear that
one of its main objectives is labor peace. This aspect of the policy is so
strong that when arbitration is provided in an agreement which does
not contain a no-strike clause, one is implied to prohibit strikes over
arbitrable disputes.' Hence, no-strike commitments in labor agree-
ments are not only Important to employers but are vital to the attain-
ment of this major national policy objective.
Because of the importance of the no-strike clause, remedies for its
breach must be readily available. This fact motivated Congress to
enact section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,2 to
provide the necessary jurisdictional basis for actions against labor
unions to enforce a union's no-strike commitment.3 The report explain-
Ing this portion of the Senate bill stated:
* A.B., 1935, Dartmouth College; J.D., cum laude, 1938, University of Chicago;
member, Illinois Bar.
I Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
2 (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
3 Section 301 (29 U.S.C. § 185)"
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as
defined in this Act, or between any such labor organzations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having ]urisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.
(b) Any labor organzation which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities
affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents.
Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and n behalf of
the employees whom it represents i the courts of the United States. Any moneyjudgment against a labor orgamzation ea distric t o f the United States
shall be enforceable only against the organzation an entity and against 
its
assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
[ 301]
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such
agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The execution
of an agreement does not by itself promote industrial peace. The chief
advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective
labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the
term of the agreement. Without some effective method of assuring
freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agreement, there
is little reason why an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to
promote industrial peace through faithful performance by the parties,
collective agreements affecting interstate commerce should be en-
forceable in the Federal courts. Our amendment would provide for
suits by unions as legal entities in the Federal courts in disputes
affecting commerce.4
Despite this clear expression of Congressional intent to establish
adequate remedies for contract breach strikes, the employer consider-
ing legal action following such a strike faces numerous problems. 5
The Scope of the No-Strike Pledge
The first variable in an employer's ability to obtain financial com-
pensation for strike action by employees m breach of a no-strike pledge
is the scope and clarity of the language of the pledge. Some labor
agreements merely say- "There shall be no strikes during the life of
this Agreement." Others say-
The Union agrees that neither it nor any officer or agent acting on
its behalf will instigate, sponsor or encourage strike action and that
any employee who engages in a strike during the life of this agree-
ment shall be subject to discharge or other discipline as determined
by the Company
(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor
organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be
deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which
such organzation maintains its principal offces, or (2) i any district in which
its duly authorized d n representing or acting for
employee members.(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other Iegal process of any court
of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organzation, n iscapacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization.
(e) For the purposes of thi section, i determining whether any personis acting as an agent" of another person so as to mae suc  other ers
responsible for is acts, the question of whether the specific acts performe were
actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
4 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR Mk'ANAGEMN REKLATIONS Ac'T OF
1947 422 (1948).
a For a discussion of the problems involved i varous employer counteractions, see
Faiweather, Employer Actions and Options i Response to a Strike Violation o a
Contract, 18th A cts , tAhq N.Y.U. Co fwh. ON LABOR (1965).
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The second clause divides the no-strike pledge into two parts-a
pledge by the employees and one by the union. It shifts to the employer
the burden of proving matters that are difficult to prove. He must show
not only instigation, sponsorship, or encouragement, but also that these
activities were conducted by persons who were officers or agents of
the union. The first clause, on the other hand, merely says that "there
shall be no strikes during the life of the agreement," and the critical
fact establishing its breach is a strike, which is easy to prove.
However, lawyers representing international unions do not believe
that their clients are liable for breaches of a no-strike pledge when the
union's members strike, even where the first type of clause is used,
unless the employer can prove that an international union official
actively instigated the strike action or later ratified it. This claim is
made notwithstanding the active instigation or subsequent ratification
of the strike by local union officials, which the attorneys for the inter-
national union concede would make the treasury of the local union,
but not that of the international, liable for the breach.
The clan that the employer must prove active instigation or actual
ratification by an official or agent of the international union, even
though the language of the no-strike pledge does not require such
proof, is actually a claim that tort law rather than contract law applies,
and, surprisingly enough, there are decisions to support this position.
The agency principle in which various courts have become en-
tangled in strike-breach cases has its roots in a century-old English
decision holding that the instigation of a breach of a contract of em-
ployment is an actionable tort.6 This principle is still part of our tort
law7
One example of an application of tort theories to bar contract
liability occurred in Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Indus. Dist.
Lodge No. 751 (1AM). In that case the international union was a ]omt
signer of the labor agreement with the local union. Both the local and
the international unions were referred to and defined in the contract,
in the singular, as "the union." In spite of this, the Court stated that the
international union and its treasury were not liable for the breach of
contract because there was no proof that an international union official
had instigated the walkout, even though it was proven that the local
union officials had done so. The requirement of strict proof of an in-
0 Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & BL. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
7 RESTATEmENT, TORTS, § 766 (1939).
8 91 F. Supp. 596, 603-608 (W.D. Wash. 1950) (dictum) aff'd, 188 F.2d 356 (9th
Cir. 1951); cf. Packmghouse Workers v. Maurer-Neuer, Inc., 272 F.2d 647 (10th Cir.
1959).
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stigating act by an agent also prevented the inposition of liability on
an international union in United Constr Workers v. Haislip Baking
Co
Other courts have used the agency approach but required very little
proof before holding the international union liable. For example, the
mere presence on a picket line of an officer of an international union
was sufficient to hold the international liable in ILWU v. Hawaiian
Pineapple Co.1° and in Gibbs v. UMW 11 The participation of an inter-
national representative in pre-strike negotiations in which he voiced
certain demands made the international union responsible in Western
States Regional Council No. 3, Int'l Woodworkers of America.2
The heavy reliance on agency law found in some decisions usually
results in insulating the treasury of the international union, which is
ordinarily the only practical source of restitution. This reliance is
caused by carrying forward, without careful analysis, the agency tests
created in section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That section pro-
vided:
[N]o association or organmzation participating or interested m a
labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the
United States for the unlawful acts of individual officials, members or
agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual
authorization of, such actions, or the ratification of such actions after
actual knowledge thereof.13
The emphasis of this provision upon the "unlawful acts of
members" and upon "proof of actual participation, authorization or
ratification" clearly indicates that it was designed to insulate the inter-
national umon and its treasury However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
now inapplicable to damage actions against unions for breach of con-
tract under section 3 0 1 .14 Today it is this more recent section that is the
source of the law governing suits for a breach of a labor agreement.
Section 301 contains the following language concerning the agency
tests to be applied.
9 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955).
10 226 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1955).
11220 F Supp. 871 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
12 137 N.L.R.B. 352, 354-355 (1962), enforced, 319 F.2d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 1963).
See also UMW v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 881 (1960); UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 746-748 (4th Cir. 1954). See generally
Evans, The Law of Agency and the National Union, 49 Ky. LJ. 295 (1961); Local 984,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Humko Co., 287 F.2d 231, 241-242 (6th Cir. 1961).
1347 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
14 UMW v. Patton, 211 F.2d 742, 747-748 (4th Cir. 1954) (dictum).
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(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an in-
dustry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, and any employer
whose activities affect commerce as defined in this Act, shall be bound
by the acts of its agents.
(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any
person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such
other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the
specific acts performed were actually authonzed or subsequently rati-
fied shall not be controlling.'5
This agency test is not expressed in the negative as is the agency test m
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and only apparent authority, not actual
authority, need be shown."s
Actions for breach of contract often involve reference to agency
principles. For example, it must be shown that the contract itself was
entered into by an authorized agent, or by one with apparent au-
thority 17 Agency principles must also be applied if the liability of the
union is limited to a promise that its union officials or agents will not
instigate or promote a strike.' 8
However, it does not follow from a recitation of an apparent-au-
thority agency test m section 301 that tort liability-that is, inducing a
breach of contract of employment-must be established before con-
tract liability can be inposed in an action for breach of the simple
pledge that there will be no strikes during the life of the agreement.
As noted above, now there is even an implied no-strike pledge concern-
ing matters which are subject to arbitration. 9 When Congress estab-
lished the right to sue a union for breach of a labor agreement to which
it is a party, it could hardly have intended to require that to obtain
recovery against the union treasury for breach of an express no-strike
pledge or of one inplied from the arbitration clause, an employer must
prove two actual wrongs, one m tort and the other in contract.
In evaluating congressional intent in enacting the quoted 301 lan-
guage, the shift in liability from the personal assets of the individual
striking employee to the assets of the union needs emphasis. That this
shift of liability to the union as an entity was intended is shown in the
following language from section 301(b)
1561 Stat. 156, 157 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b), (e) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
36 Burstem, Enforcement of Collective Agreements by the Courts, 6TH ANNuAL
N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 31, 47 (1953).
17 See Watteau v. FenwiAk, [1893] 1 Q.B. 346 (1892).
18 Garmeada Coal Co. v. International Union, UMW, 230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956).
19 See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of
the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as
an entity and against its assets and shall not be enforceable against
any individual member or his assets.20
This protection of the individual, if the union is liable, results from
a reaction against the manner in which damages were collected by the
employer after the infamous Danbury Hatters case,21 where the judg-
ments were collected from individual employees, causing some of them
to lose their homes.22 The Seventh Circuit had said, in Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atktnson,23 that Congress meant that individual employees
should be free from liability for strike action engaged in by other em-
ployees, but should remain liable for their own breaches. However,
the Supreme Court held that, if the union was liable for the breach,
the individual employee, even though he engaged in the breach, was
not.24 On the other hand, it pointed out that it was not deciding
whether the individual employees remained insulated from liability
when the union was not liable.2 5
If the individual becomes liable when the union is not, it would
seem to be contrary to congressional intention for the courts to create
impossible barriers of proof for the employer to climb before liability
can be imposed on the union. Insulation of the individual is not
meaningful unless the union can be held liable for the contract breach.
Requiring proof of the tort of instigation before proving the union's
contract liability would not effectuate the apparent congressional in-
tention to insulate the individual striking employee from personal
liability
Behind this congressional intention to shift liability from the mdi-
vidual to the union may well be a public policy consideration. If the
union is liable for the breach caused when its members strike, the union
as an entity will be stimulated to establish controls and develop disci-
plines that will cause the members to respect no-strike clauses m labor
agreements.
The importance, from the point of view of public policy, of im-
posing liability upon the union treasury when the employee members
breach their agreement by engaging in strike action, even if union
20 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1964). (Emphasis added.)
21 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
22 Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 Fed. 444 (2d Cir. 1916). See Atkinson
v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248 (1962).
23290 F.2d 312, 317-319 (7th Cir. 1961), remanded, 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
2 4 Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Company, 370 U.S. 238, 247-249 (1962).
25 Id. at 249, n.7.
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officials do not instigate, authorize, or ratify, was well expressed by
Arbitrator H. H. Rams in Brynmore Press, Inc.26 He said:
The economic power and the legal status of labor unions requires
a commensurate degree of responsibility.
The parties pledged that there would be no stoppage of work,
slowdown, or lockout during the life of the contract for any reason.
In signing the contract the workers and the union leaders
fully understood the obligation imposed by their agreement with
management . .
The crux of the issue before the arbitrator is that a breach of the
contract between the company and the union took place and that the
company claims appropriate remedies for that wrongful breach. The
responsibility of the union for such wrongful breach is clear, and
failure to apply proper effective remedies in the form of prohibition
orders, assessments of penalties, and award of damages claimed by the
aggrieved party would have the effect of freeing the union and its
members from liability for their actions. Such failure could only
mitigate against the desirable ideal of "Union responsibility" Assess-
ment of penalties and award of damages payable to the aggrieved
party is a step in the direction of preserving "Union responsibility"
and its integrity as the "responsible party" to the collective bargaining
agreement. 27
An even clearer case of a union treasury being held liable without
any proof of mstigation, authorization, or ratification by a union agent
was the award in Publishers Ass'n of N.Y 28 In that case damages of
1,029 dollars were assessed against the union because striking union
members shut down the presses printing the New York Times for
twenty-one minutes. The work stoppage ended within minutes after-a
union business agent arrived at the Times Building and instructed the
striking members to return to work. In spite of this, the arbitrator
imposed liability on the union, even though he made the following
finding: "The unlawful work stoppage and contract violation were
caused or instigated without the knowledge or consent; nor with
privity or connvance of any authorized, responsible official of the
union." 29 It can be seen that experienced arbitrators recognize that
irresponsible strikes in breach of contract will not disappear unless the
union is liable for such actions.
Therefore, when considering the proof of the liability of the union
for the breach caused by the striking members, it is imperative that
protective agency concepts inherited from another statute, enacted in
287 Lab. Arb. 648 (1947).
27 Id. at 657-58.
28 39 Lab. Arb. 564 (Arb. Moskowitz, 1962).
20 Id. at 567.
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a different era, be forgotten. The intentions of Congress should be
found not in historical decisions, but in section 301 and in the national
labor policy being created by the courts as they interpret congressional
intention since its enactment.
Effectuation of Congressional Intention
through Presumptions
Difficulties confronting the employer, because of the requirement
that the tort of mstigation be proved before recovery may be had for
contract breach, have been eliminated by courts and arbitrators who
recognize the socio-psychological fact that group action is induced by
persons who act as leaders. These courts and arbitrators have adopted
a rebuttable presumption that, when a strike occurs, it has been insti-
gated by the union officers, who are the leaders chosen by the mem-
bers. To escape from the consequences of this presumption, the union
must show that its leadership was rejected and that other persons not
agents of the uion had assumed control.
The first and classic decision that reports this rebuttable presump-
tion is United States v. International Union, UMW,30 wherein John L.
Lewis attempted to disclaun responsibility for a simultaneous nation-
wide work stoppage in the coal mines by declaring that the miners
decided to strike "entirely on their own volition and without mstruc-
tions from the President, direct or indirect."31 Judge Goldsborough
said that if the law encouraged the use of the "nod or wink" union
responsibility would evaporate, because liability would evaporate. He
then wisely made these observations:
[T]his Court believes that there is a principle of law which, as far
as I know, no Court has ever been called upon to announce, because
this use of a code in order for a uion to avoid responsibility is a new
thing. It is a new method of endeavoring to avoid responsibility
The Court thinks the principle is this: that as long as a union is
functioning as a union it must be held responsible for the mass action
of its members. It is perfectly obvious not only in objective reasoning
but because of experience that men don't act collectively without
leadership. The idea of suggesting that from 350,000 to 450,000 men
would all get the same idea at once, independently of leadership, and
walk out of the mines, is, of course, simply ndiculous.
So that, in general, this Court announces a principle of law The
Court has no means of knowing whether higher courts will adopt the
principle or not, but-the Court has no doubt about its soundness, not
30 77 F Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 871 (1949).
31 77 F Supp. at 564.
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any-that a union that is functioning must be held responsible for the
mass action of its members.3 2
These observations were made in a contempt action where a strike
had occurred m violation of an injunction. The importance of Golds-
boroughs decision was magnified when the same presumptions were
announced by another court in another contempt action. In United
States v. Brotherhood of Ry., Trainmen,33 the court said:
[A]s long as the Union functions as a Union the Union is respon-
sible for the mass actions of its members. That means this, that when
the members go out and act in a concerted fashion and do an illegal
act the Union is responsible. They just can't say, "Oh, well, we didn't
do that as Union members."
If they are members of the Union, then they do act mn concerted
fashion under the decision of the courts m this country; if it is a mass
action the Union is responsible for that sort of an action.
*t *
Now, can the Union escape responsibility under that sort of a
situation? Let us admit Mr. Kennedy did what he says he did, all he
says he says he did, and these officers did all they say they did. Yet,
the great mass of the Union stayed out. They said, "We refuse to work.
We are sick." And they carned on what it is admitted was an un-
authorized work stoppage or unauthorized strike. That is admitted.34
And, most significantly to the employer in the normal strike in
breach of agreement case, the same rules of presumption were adopted
recently by a federal district court to hold a union responsible for a
strike in breach of a no-strike pledge. In United Textile Workers v.
Newberry Mills, Inc.,35 the court stated:
As long as a union is functioning as a union it must be held
responsible for the mass action of its members. It is perfectly obvious
not only m objective reasoning but because of experience that men
don't act collectively without leadership. The idea of suggesting that
the number of people who went on strike would all get the same idea
at once, independently of leadership, and walk out of defendant's mill
"is of course simply ridiculous." A union that is functioning must be
held responsible for the mass action of its members. The above stated
prnciples of law will preserve the union, "because if the plan is
adopted throughout the country of trying to use a wink, a nod, a code,
instead of the word 'strike,' and if that sort of a maneuver is recog-
nized as valid by the Courts" then we "will have among the unions
lawlessness, chaos, and ultimate anarchy And then the unions will
321d. at 566-67 (dictum).
3396 F Supp. 428 (N.D. Ill. 1951).
34 Id. at 431-432.
35 238 F Supp. 366 (W.D.S.C. 1965) (dictum).
December, 19651 PRESUMPTON OF INSTIGATON
have to be socialized. In other words, they will have to be de-
stroyed."36
Arbitrators, too, have recogmzed tins principle. In Mueller Brass
Co.,37 Arbitrator David Wolff upheld discipline imposed upon the
union officials who participated in an unauthorized strike, stating:
The fact that all those who participated in the lines were not
punished is understandable. From all the testimony, it appears to the
arbitrator that the Company disciplined only those persons who were
union officials. Such action on its part was not discriminatory It had a
right to assume that, when union officials participated m unauthorized
activities, they were acting as leaders.38
In General American Transp. Corp.,3 9 Arbitrator Harry Pollock
wrote:
It is generally safe to say that members of unions do not act in
concert without leadership. Tins rule is proven by experience. Since
this local was functioning and there was apparently no schism, the
union leadership must be held responsible for the acts of its
members.40
Hence, there is no lack of decisional authority to support the sug-
gested presumption.
Rebutting the Presumption of Union Responsibility
The presumption of union liability for a strike may be rebutted if
the union comes forward with persuasive evidence identifying the
actual strike instigators. In some cases the ringleaders may be a group
of dissident employees within the bargaining unit. In other cases the
leaders may be agents of another union attempting to discredit the
incumbent union so it can be displaced as the representative.
The union officials are certainly in a far better position to deter-
mine the real instigators than are the representatives of the employer.
The union stewards are in every department and know those employees
who are making an effort to discredit the incumbent union. Finally, if
the strike is orgamzed by agents of a raiding union, witnesses should
be willing to testify concerning their activity, as such testimony would
support their own (the incumbent) union.
Requiring the union officials to come forward and identify the
36 Id. at 373.
37 3 Lab. Arb. 285 (1946).
38 Id. at 308.
3942 Lab. Arb. 142 (1964).
40 Id. at 143-144.
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instigators of a contract breach strike or to assume responsibility for it
will promote labor peace during the term of the contract. Employees
contemplating strike action contrary to the union's sanction would
know they face the risk of exposure and subsequent discipline (usually
discharge) by the employer. The raiding uion would also be risking a
suit for the tort of inducing a breach of contract if its agents instigated
a contract breach strike.4
Arbitrators have adopted reasoning similar to that suggested herein
in several cases where they were reviewing discipline for violation of
the no-strike clause. For example, in Kaye-Tex Mfg Co.,42 the em-
ployer disciplined seven employees it thought were "responsible" for a
wildcat strike involving more than seventy employees. The union
claimed that the employer could not discipline only seven out of the
seventy The arbitrator rejected this contention, noting especially the
umon's'failure to assist the employer in determining who the actual
leaders were. He stated:
The Union is not in the best position to complain of inadequacies
in the Company's procedure for fixing responsibility It declined to
name those who should be blamed. That it did not know who they
were and could not find out is a little incredible. If it knew and
wouldn't say, although importuned often to do so, its interest in seeing
strict justice done might be a little less than its complaint about the
Company's procedure would suggest.
A refusal to disclose information out of a desire to protect a brother
member would it seems to me be a mistaken loyalty The officers of
the Union have a serious responsibility to live up to the contract
obligations. The no-strike obligation is only met by effectively pre-
venting unauthorized work stoppages. The history of such stoppages
and the April 7, 1959 settlement agreement strongly underscores this
obligation. It is not fully met by urging the men to go back after a
wildcat occurs. It includes as well the responsibility to deter by seeing
that those who violate the contract are disciplined. Indeed, many
responsible umons have taken strong action against wildcaters, [sc]
even expelling them from the Union.43
In arriving at the above conclusion, Arbitrator Horlacher noted the
difficulties that would confront an employer if he had the burden of
proving the identity of the strike ringleaders. He reasoned that, if uion
officers fail to come forward with the identity of the actual strike
leaders, the employer may make the selection. Otherwise, the no-strike
41See, e.g., Sterling & Welch Co. v. Duke, 33 Ohio Op. 482, 486-87, 67 N.E.2d
24, 29-30 (Ohio C.P. 1946); PiossEn, ToiRr § 123 (3d ed. 1964).
4236 Lab. Arb. 660 (Arb. J. P. Horlacher, 1960).
43 Id. at 665.
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clause would become a "nullity," and "an interpretation making the
no-strike clause of the Agreement a nullity must be rejected. 44
Similarly, in Ford Motor Co.,45 Arbitrator Harry P Shulman said:
It will serve no useful purpose to relate in detail the evidence with
respect to the nineteen employees against whom the Company took
action as a result of this stoppage. It is loudly whspered-and doubt-
less truly-that the real instigators of the stoppage, or at least some
of them, have not been penalized. But if thus is so, it is because the
Company lacked knowledge of the alleged real instigators. The em-
ployees upon whom it imposed penalties are those against whom it
had evidence of active participation which it believed would support
its judgment in the ultimate proceedings before the Umpire. If the
real instigators have been omitted, they are still subject to the Umon's
own powers of discipline. And perhaps more accurate findings of guilt
could have been made in the first place if the Union had fully assumed
responsibility for investigating the stoppage and taking action against
the violators of its Constitution and Contract.40
Conclusion
As our national labor policy develops by judicial interpretation of
congressional intention in the section 301 cases, it is clear that labor
peace and umon responsibility are important public policy objectives.
Requiring the employer to prove the tort of instigation where mem-
bers of a union strike in violation of a no-strike pledge, unless the
language of the labor agreement clearly .requires it, has the practical
effect of generally insulating the union from responsibility and thereby
permitting irresponsibility
The courts and arbitrators who apply presumptions to eliminate the
necessity of proving the tort of instigation are promoting the above
objectives of our national labor policy When they do so, they are not
actually abandoning tort thnking. Rather, they are applying to the
strike situation reasoning similar to that underlying the universally
recognized tort principle of res spsa loquitur That principle is applied
in negligence cases, m some jurisdictions creating a permissible infer-
ence of negligence and m others a rebuttable presumption.1 Regard-
less of the jurisdiction, however, it does at least assist in the establish-
ment of a prima facie case.48
44Id. at 663.
45 1 Am. Lab. Arb. Awards I[ 67,278 (1945).
46 Id. at 67,629-30.
47PaossEa, ToRTs § 40 (3d ed. 1964).
48 Compare Sweeney v. Ervmg, 228 U.S. 233 (1913) (permissible inference) with
Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794, 205 S.W.2d 690 (1947) (presumption). See Bunr v.
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Res spsa loquitur operates when (1) the occurrence is of such a
nature that it ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's
negligence, (2) the apparent cause of the occurrence is such that the
defendant would be responsible for the occurrence, and (3) the evi-
dence explaining the occurrence is more accessible to the defendant
than the plaintiff.49 These same factors are present m the strike situa-
tion. A strike ordinarily does not occur in the absence of leadership.
The group leaders are the umon leaders, and the union is the institution
through which the employees ordinarily take group action. If some
other group leaders have taken over, the evidence concerning that fact
is more readily accessible to the union than the employer. The analogy
to the tort doctrine of res spsa loquitur may not be perfect, but it is fair
to say that where there is a labor union representing a group of em-
ployees through elected leaders and a strike in violation of the agree-
ment occurs, the literal50 translation, "the thing itself speaks," applies.
Increased use and articulation of presumptions by courts and arbi-
trators in analyzing contract breach strike cases will promote the
national labor policy favoring contract stability and the concomitant
industrial peace.
Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954). But see Zentz v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 334 (1952).
4 9 PRossEp, op. cit. supra note 47, § 39.5 0 But see comment of Shaw, L.J., m Ballard v. North British Ry., [1923] Sess. Cas.
H.L. 43, 56.
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